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Abstract
We present a study of the European electronic interbank market of overnight lending (e-
MID) before and after the beginning of the financial crisis. The main goal of the paper is to
explain the structural changes of lending/borrowing features due to the liquidity turmoil. Unlike
previous contributions that focused on banks’ dependent and macro information as explanatory
variables, we address the role of banks’ behaviour and market microstructure as determinants of
the credit spreads. We show that all banks experienced significant variations in their liquidity
costs due to the sensitivity of interbank rates to the timing and side of trades. We argue that,
while larger banks did experience better funding conditions after the crisis, this was not just
a consequence of the “too big to fail” perception of the market. Larger banks have been able
to play more strategically when managing their liquidity by taking advantage of the changing
market microstructure.
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1 Introduction
Interbank markets play a key role in the liquidity management of banks and in the transmission
of monetary policy. Well-functioning interbank markets effectively channel liquidity from financial
intermediaries with a surplus of funds to those in need, allowing for more efficient financial inter-
mediation. Variations in interbank rates are transmitted to the entire term structure, affecting
borrowing conditions for households and firms. Interbank rates provide benchmarks (e.g. the Libor,
Euribor and Eonia) for the pricing of fixed-income securities and derivative contracts such as short-
term interest rate futures and interest rate swaps, used by banks to hedge their short-term interest
rate risks. Thus, policymakers have an interest in a financial system with an efficient interbank
market, that is, one in which the central bank can achieve its desired rate of interest and one that
allows institutions to trade liquidity minimizing transaction costs and information asymmetries.
Before the crisis, interbank markets were among the most liquid in the financial sector and the
literature has historically devoted a relatively low consideration to the interbank market due to the
short-term nature of the exchanged deposits. Banks used to accept non-collateralised loans because
counterparties were considered safe and sound enough and liquidity risk was perceived as marginal
due to the central bank role as lender of last resort. However, during the 2007–2008 financial crisis,
liquidity in the interbank market has considerably dried up, even at short maturities. Also an
increasing dispersion in the credit conditions of different banks has emerged. These events have
triggered a new interest in interbank markets. The dramatic change of volumes and the drop in
the number of active banks after the subprime crisis can be hardly explained as a real reduction of
liquidity need by banks. A number of papers in the literature have explained this “market freeze”
with two hypotheses: liquidity hoarding versus credit monitoring (Heider et al. 2015, Acharya et
al. 2013, Gale and Yorulmazer 2011). On the demand side, a possible explanation for the crunch
suggested by Cassola et al. (2010) was adverse selection: banks prefer not to reveal their needs
for liquidity, which could lead to credit rationing, and switch from a highly transparent electronic
market to more opaque over-the-counter markets.
On the empirical side, a number of papers investigated the microstructure properties of the
interbank market before the crisis. The US Federal Funds market was studied by Hamilton (1996),
Furfine (2000), Furfine (2001) and Furfine (2002). Beaupain and Durre´ (2008) presented a com-
prehensive analysis of the dynamics of the Euro overnight money market using data until April
2007. They uncovered regular seasonal patterns of market activity and liquidity, as well as patterns
determined by the Eurosystem operational framework. Iori et al. (2008) studied the evolution of
the network topology of the European interbank electronic market (e-MID) within maintenance
periods in the years 1999–2002 by applying methods of statistical mechanics. They showed that
a large number of small/medium size banks tend to be liquidity providers for a small number of
large banks; strategic behaviour, in terms of preferential and speculative lending, tends to be rather
limited in e-MID. Baglioni and Monticini (2008) showed the presence of an intraday term structure
of interest rates in a way that the overnight rate displays a clear downward pattern throughout the
trading session, with banks borrowing at a premium early in the morning and at a discount at the
end of the day. This finding for 2003–2004 was confirmed over the longer period 1999–2009 by Iori
et al. (2015c) among several other empirical features of the e-MID they analysed for those 11 years.
An increasing number of studies has analysed how the financial crisis has affected the credit
conditions of banks in the interbank market. Angelini et al. (2011) analysed the spreads between
uncollateralised e-MID rates and collateralised repo rates on maturities from one week to 12 months.
They observed that the mean spread increases and the distribution becomes more disperse during
the crisis. The question they address is what share of the soaring spread is due to an increased
bank-specific default risk and what to a generalised surge in risk aversion measured from the equity
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market. They find that before the crisis bank size is the only important borrower characteristic
to determine spreads, and large banks get better rates. During the crisis the effect of borrower
creditworthiness, measured by rating and capitalization, becomes significant, with larger banks still
experiencing better borrowing conditions both before and after the Lehman collapse, but still small.
The main determinant of the increasing spreads (two thirds of the effect) appears to be the overall
increase in risk aversion. A similar effect of size on spread is found by Gabrieli (2012), who focuses on
the overnight determinant of credit spreads, defined as the difference between the volume-weighted
average daily interbank rate and the ECB policy rate. Berardi and Tedeschi (2017) studied how
banks’ strategies based on achieving a low interest rate and a high supply of liquidity influence
the banks’ performance and the network topology of the interbank market. Tedeschi et al. (2018)
explored banks’ reaction to financial shocks and how banks’ strategies influence financial cycles.
Schwarz (2018) estimated the credit risk measure through the default horizon mismatch of credit
default swaps (CDS) with interbank spreads.
The above studies have focused on the role of borrower- and lender-specific features as well as
market-wide effects to explain the rise in the spreads during the crisis. In this paper we provide
new evidence that banks’ strategic behaviour also played a role in determining the cross-sectional
variations in lending and borrowing spreads. Our analysis shows that the crisis was a turning point
in banks behaviour: while on average some banks managed the liquidity needs better or worse than
others, they all experienced a large variability of their rates over time. Such variability is not easy
to explain only in terms of bank-specific characteristics or idiosyncratic risks. After the turmoil,
the interbank market microstructure became particularly relevant. We find that the time and the
side of a trade significantly affect the funding rate: the higher the volume traded by a bank in
the morning, the higher the spreads (that is, borrowing conditions deteriorate in the morning for
borrowers and improve for lenders), and the higher the volume traded as quoters, the better the
rates obtained by lenders and borrowers.
Our data source is the e-MID platform used by European banks to exchange uncollateralized
interbank funds. We focus on the overnight segment of the market, which is the most liquid and
represents about 90% of all interbank transactions. According to the European Central Bank, the
e-MID accounted for 17% of total turnover in unsecured money market in the Euro Area before the
crisis. Each bank in the dataset is identified by a unique code, its size class and nationality, so one can
follow a bank’s activity over time. However, not knowing the real identity of the banks, one cannot
match individual interbank transactions with bank characteristics extrapolated from balance sheet
and credit rating data.1 Nonetheless, as shown by Angelini et al. (2011), bank characteristics, with
the exception of size, only played a minor role in explaining cross-sectional variations in lending and
borrowing spreads. This was partly because bank-specific creditworthiness, captured by variables
such as credit ratings, capital ratios, or profitability remained roughly unchanged during the pre-
crisis and crisis periods or improved slightly. Neither borrower and lender liquidity nor their shortage
of capital correlated with spreads in the study of Angelini et al. (2011). This suggests that banks
were unwilling to engage in peer monitoring efforts before and during the crisis. The effect of sizes,
while significant, in itself is unlikely to reflect positively on the credit-worthiness of large banks
that were more exposed to the crisis because of their complexity and international interconnection.
Angelini et al. (2011) and Gabrieli (2012) argue that their results rather suggest the existence of a
too-big-to-fail guarantee implicitly granted by the market to the banks with the highest volumes of
business. In fact, the price benefit enjoyed by relatively bigger banks becomes much stronger after
September 2008, i.e. when European governments were forced to make explicit the promise that
1While our main cross-sectional regression results do not incorporate banks’ specific characteristics other than size
and nationality, we perform an additional robustness check using a panel data model with time and bank fixed effects
that can capture bank characteristics such as credit and liquidity risk.
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no other systemically important financial institution would be allowed to fail. Instead we argue
that, while larger banks did experience better funding condition during the crisis, this was not just
a consequence of the “too big to fail” perception of the market; rather we show that larger banks
took advantage of the changing market microstructure.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the properties of the e-MID
market and analyses the dataset. Section 3 introduces the explanatory variables of the regression
models. Section 4 explains the econometric methodology followed in this study and reports the
empirical findings. Section 5 concludes.
2 e-MID market and data
This section is divided into two parts: the first introduces the characteristics of the e-MID interbank
market; the second explains the dataset of interbank rates used for our empirical analysis.
2.1 The e-MID market
Interbank markets can be organised in different ways: physically on trading floors, by telephone
calls, or on electronic platforms. In Europe, interbank trades are executed in all these ways. The
only electronic market for interbank deposits in the Euro area and the USA is the e-MID (Mercato
Interbancario elettronico dei Depositi) that was established in Italy in 1990. Under the supervision
of the Bank of Italy, credit institutions and investment companies can participate in this market
if their total net asset size is respectively at least 10 million US Dollars and 300 million Euros (or
their equivalents in another currency). Interbank deposit maturities range from overnight to one
year, with overnight contracts representing about 90% of the total volume. An overnight trade
is defined as a transfer of funds on the day of the trade with return at 9am of the subsequent
business day. Trading starts at 8am and ends at 6pm. The large majority of volumes are traded
in the Euro section of the market and, more specifically, on the overnight contracts. Before the
financial crisis the platform had 246 members from 29 EU countries and the US, of which 30 were
central banks acting as market observers to monitor the interbank deposit size and rates. After the
Lehman failure, the number of countries with banks actively participating in the e-MID market was
down to 16: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and United Kingdom. In January 2014
the e-MID recorded 127 banks from 28 countries trading liquidity (92 Italian banks and 35 foreign
banks) and 29 Central Banks as observers. The e-MID company itself is participated by 31 banks.
The number of transactions and the trading volume increased systematically until the begin-
ning of the financial crisis, with an average of 450 transactions each day and an exposure for each
transaction of about 5.5 million Euros. According to Baglioni and Monticini (2008), this evolution
is due to the trend toward real-time settlement for payments, securities and foreign exchange trans-
actions that took place in recent years. This trend has increased the value of intraday liquidity.
As shown by Iazzetta and Manna (2009), interbank deposits as a percentage of total assets of the
banking system doubled from 8% in 1993 to approximately 16% in 2007. From the end of 2006
until mid-2008 the share of transactions executed via e-MID in the unsecured Euro money market
has remained roughly unchanged at 17%. After the crisis, the market share of the e-MID decreased
to 10% (ECB Report 2011).
The main difference with respect to security markets is that market participants can choose
their counterparties. An operator willing to trade can pick a quote and manifest his wish to close
the trade. Trades are public in terms of maturity, rate, volume, and time. While the identity of
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the quoting bank is normally public too (the quoter may choose to post a trade anonymously, but
this option is rarely used), the identity of the aggressor, that is the party that initiates the deal
accepting the proposed transaction, can only be disclosed by a quoter during the negotiation phase.
A quoter, i.e. a bank that is willing to lend capital and proposes a transaction, has the option to
reject an aggression, and similarly an aggressor has the additional option of not closing a trade after
knowing the counterparty, if this was not public. An aggressor can also subordinate his wish of
closing a trade to specific requests, such as a larger or smaller volume or a different rate. The e-MID
thus provides a transparent platform where all parties can monitor in real time the evolution of
traded rates, while benchmarks like the Libor and Euribor, as seen in the 2012 Libor fixing scandal,
can be easily manipulated. For more details on the order-driven market mechanism of the e-MID,
see Iori et al. (2015c).
2.2 Data
The dataset used for this study consists of all transactions recorded in the platform between 15
June 2006 and 7 December 2009. The period after 2009 was characterised by the Greek crisis and
the consequent contagion to the sovereign debt of other European countries; transactions on the
interbank market were therefore affected more by the sustainability component of the public debt
than by banking characteristics. For each transaction the bank size measured by total assets is
provided in five categories: major banks (“MA”; total assets higher than 60 billion Euro), large
banks (“LA”; from 26 to 60 billion Euro), medium banks (“ME”; from 9 to 26 million Euro), small
banks (“SM”; from 1.3 to 9 million Euro) and minor banks (“MI”; less than 1.3 million Euro). The
size classification was stable over time.
The database does not provide information on the state of the book, its dynamics and how the
banks use this information when acting on the market. A dataset similar to ours was the object of
a number of past studies (Angelini et al. 2011, Baglioni and Monticini 2008, Baglioni and Monticini
2013, Beaupain and Durre´ 2008, Brunetti et al. 2015, Finger et al. 2012, Galbiati et al. 2013, Iori
et al. 2006, Iori et al. 2008, Iori et al. 2015a, Iori et al. 2015b, Iori et al. 2015c), while Brousseau
and Manzanares (2005) performed a study using the full book information.
It is known that the trading activity of borrowers/lenders is affected by the reserve maintenance
period announced by the ECB rather than by calendar month effects. This is so because banks
need to comply with regulatory requirements on the average amount of liquidity held over such
periods. Empirically, for the Eonia rates, Gaspar et al. (2008) report an increase in market activity
towards the last days of the reserve maintenance period described by a remarkable increment in the
number of transactions and the underlying volatility of interest. In order to reduce the noise due to
extreme movements on daily funding spreads around the end of the reserve maintenance periods, we
consider average monthly spreads computed over the entire reserve maintenance periods rather than
daily observations. In our dataset, we have 42 monthly periods determined by reserve maintenance
periods.
We also control the occurrence of structural breaks in the distributional relationship between
funding rates and dependant variables by dividing our time period into three non-overlapping sub-
periods. Table 1 presents information about the subperiods considered in the study. Period 1,
the pre-crisis, covers the period June 2006 to June 2007. Period 2, the subprime crisis, goes from
the first outburst of the crisis until the Lehman Brothers default. We chose mid June 2007 as the
flare-up of the crisis because at this date Bear Stearns & Co informed investors in two of its CDO
hedge funds that it was halting redemptions. This event was followed in mid July by Moody’s
downgrading of 131 ABS emissions backed by subprime residential mortgages; on July 30 by Ger-
many’s IKB reporting substantial losses and revealing that its main shareholder, KfW, had assumed
5
its financial obligations; on August 9 by French investment bank BNP Paribas suspending three
investment funds that invested in subprime mortgage debt, and on August 10 by central banks
coordinate efforts to increase liquidity for the first time since September 11, 2001. Period 3, the
post-crisis, represents the dates after the default of Lehman Brothers and most of the central bank
interventions to sustain the liquidity need of the banking systems; it also includes the Northern
Rock run occurred in mid September 2007 and the Bear Sterns default in mid March 2008.
Table 1: Definition of the studied sub-periods and number of reserve maintenance periods within
each of them.
Period Dates Reserve Maintenance Periods
1. Pre-crisis 15 June 2006 – 12 June 2007 12
2. Subprime crisis 13 June 2007 – 7 October 2008 16
3. Post-crisis 8 October 2008 – 7 December 2009 14
Our empirical analysis focuses on funding spreads rather than funding rates, which could be
affected by macroeconomic rather than risk factors. We analyse daily spreads and daily volatility
as descriptive statistics to increase our understanding about the structure of the spreads during
the time period considered and we focus on monthly spreads to run the regression models. The
volume-weighted average daily credit spread cj,d for bank j in day d is defined as
cj,d =
1
Vj,d
Nj,d∑
i=1
Vi,j,d(ri,j,d − rd), (1)
where Vi,j,d and ri,j,d are the volume and rate of transaction i of bank j in day d, Nj,d is the number
of transactions of bank j in day d and Vj,d =
∑Nj,d
i=1 Vi,j,d is the total volume traded by bank j in
day d; rd is the volume-weighted average rate of day d,
rd =
1
Vd
Nd∑
j=1
Nj,d∑
i=1
Vi,j,d ri,j,d, (2)
where Vd =
∑Nd
j=1 Vj,d is the total trading volume of all Nd banks active in day d. If in a given day
d a bank participates in both borrowing (buy) and lending (sell) transactions, two separate credit
spread coefficients cbj,d and c
s
j,d can be defined. The credit spreads provide a measure of the ability
of a bank to borrow or lend at competitive rates relatively to the mean rate observed in that day
in the same market. Thus the spread does not depend on specific features of the interbank market
with respect to other markets, such as when the spread in the uncollateralised market is defined by
using a collateralised market as reference. Figure 1 shows the quantile plots of the cross-sectional
daily borrowing and lending spreads. The figure clearly indicates that while, before the crisis, banks
were experiencing similar credit conditions with respect to each other, during the crisis much more
variation was observed among borrowers and lenders, with a peak in correspondence of the Lehman
default. In fact the cross-sectional mean spreads became negative after the default of Lehman
Brothers, indicating that several banks were experiencing better than average borrowing conditions
(and worse than average lending conditions), but for a few banks in the tails trading happened on
much worse terms. As mentioned before, there has been a considerable effort in the literature to
explain this variation, and size has been identified as the main bank-specific factor to drive banks’
spreads (Angelini et al. 2011, Gabrieli 2012).
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Figure 1: Cross-sectional spreads (top) and their variance (bottom) for borrowers (left) and lenders
(right).
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Nonetheless, during the financial turmoil all banks have experienced a high variability in their
borrowing and lending rates. Indeed the first contribution of our analysis is to show that not only
the volatility of the average e-MID rate increased during the crisis, but also the borrowing and
lending spreads of individual banks experienced a large variability too. To show this empirically,
we calculate the volume-weighted variance of each bank
Var(cj,m) =
1
Vj,m
Nj,m∑
d=1
Nj,d∑
i=1
Vi,j,d(ri,j,d − rd)2 −
 1
Vj,m
Nj,m∑
d=1
Nj,d∑
i=1
Vi,j,d(ri,j,d − rd)
2 , (3)
where Vj,m =
∑Nj,m
d=1
∑Nj,d
i=1 Vi,j,d is the volume and Nj,m is the number of transactions of bank j in
the reserve maintenance period m of Nm days. Figure 1 shows the quantile plot of the cross-sectional
spread of individual banks and their variance separately for borrowing and lending transactions.
These quantities considerably increased during the crisis, in particular after the Lehman default.
Notably, while the spreads themselves do not show significant changes ahead of the summer 2007,
the cross-sectional variance presents a significant peak in the early months of 2007, providing in this
way the first early warning signal of the forthcoming crisis. Figure 2 shows the box plots of spreads
for the different groups in the three periods. It appears that the major banks obtained the lowest
borrowing spreads and the large banks the highest lending spreads (in Period 1 and Period 2) on
average. Nonetheless these two groups experienced a variability comparable, if not larger, to that
of the other groups.
Figure 2: Borrowers (top) and lenders (bottom) spread for different groups of banks in Period 1
(pre-crisis, left), Period 2 (subprime crisis, middle), Period 3 (post-crisis, right).
Moreover, banks’ good and bad performances were not consistent over time. As a measure of
consistency of bank performance we measure the autocorrelation of lending and borrowing credit
spreads in trading time units (banks differ substantially in term of size and frequency of trades,
with some banks settling only a few trades in a year and others trading several times a day). We
estimate the cut-off lag as the first time lag at which the autocorrelation becomes statistically not
significant (at significance level 5%). The meaning of this measure is to identify the continuity of
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Figure 3: Bank borrowing (top) and lending (bottom) spread (y-axis) versus cut-off lag (normalised
by mean participation in the reserve maintenance period, x-axis) for Period 1 (pre-crisis, left),
Period 2 (subprime crisi, middle), Period 3 (post-crisis, right).
9
banks’ behaviour either as a borrower or as a lender. We then compare the cut-off point to the
bank trading frequency, that is the average number of days a bank is active (as a borrower or as a
lender) in a reserve maintenance period.
In Figure 3 we plot, for each bank, the ratio of the bank cut-off point to its trading frequency
versus its average credit spread. The horizontal line at 0 and the vertical line at 1 separate the
phase space into four regions. The left quadrants Q1 (top) and Q4 (bottom) contain banks whose
performance autocorrelation is shorter than a reserve maintenance period, while the right quadrants
Q2 (top) and Q3 (bottom) identify banks with a performance autocorrelation longer than a reserve
maintenance period. The figure shows that, as the crisis progressed from Period 1 to Period 3,
banks’ performances became more diversified and banks were locked for longer in their patterns of
over- or under-performance. Nonetheless, only very few borrowers and lenders experienced autocor-
relations beyond a single reserve maintenance period. If spreads were determined by bank-specific
characteristics, such as credit rating or size, or by a consistent strategic behaviour, we would expect
to find a long-term autocorrelation in their performance, that is not observable here. Thus, our
analysis questions whether banks’ spreads may have been affected not only by idiosyncratic factors,
in particular credit ones, but also by factors such as the market conditions at the time banks execute
their trades.
3 Explanatory variables and their relationship with interbank spreads
In this section we identify explanatory variables related to microstructure features that can poten-
tially affect interbank spreads. As shown in the following subsections, four features of the market
changed considerably after the beginning of the crisis: the slope of the intraday rate term structure,
the market bid-ask spread, the reserve requirement effect and the price impact.
3.1 Term structure of intraday spreads
As initially reported by Baglioni and Monticini (2008), trading in the interbank market is more
expensive in the morning than in the afternoon. This is due to the implicit intraday maturity of
overnight deposits, which are not expected to be reimbursed after 24 hours, but at 9am of the day
following the trade (foreign banks were allowed to settle their operations at 12am, but only one did
so). Therefore, overnight deposits traded earlier in the morning have a longer maturity and higher
expected yields. Baglioni and Monticini (2013) studied the evolution of the intraday term structure
during the crisis. They report a considerable increase in the slope of the yield curve after the default
of Lehman that may create a risk-free profit opportunity (lend in the morning and borrow in the
afternoon). The authors suggest that this opportunity is not arbitraged away after the crisis for two
main reasons: uncertainty about the availability of liquidity late in the afternoon and an increase in
the implicit cost of collaterals. We calculate the intraday interest rate spread sd(t) as the difference
between the instantaneous rates within a window of one hour centered around time t of day d (i.e.,
considering the trades performed in the 30 minutes before and after t) and the average rate of that
day2. Figure 4 shows the average intraday interest rate spread in Period 1, 2 and 3, which is in line
with the results of Baglioni and Monticini (2013).3
2Baglioni and Monticini (2013) use the main refinancing rate as reference. We choose to estimate the spread with
respect to the average market rate so that the spread is not directly affected by official rates and monetary policy
decisions.
3Although the market is open 8am–6pm, in Figure 4 we consider only the data 9am–5pm because only in Greece
and Portugal markets are open 8–9am and 5–6pm.
10
8 10 12 14 16 18
time of day
−0.13
−0.08
−0.03
0.02
0.07
int
ra
da
y a
ve
ra
ge
 sp
re
ad
Figure 4: Intraday spread averaged over Period 1 (black circles), Period 2 (red squares) and Period 3
(green diamonds).
The observation of such a slope in the term structure of overnight rates suggests the possibility
of an opportunistic behaviour for banks with liquidity surplus: lend in the morning, borrow in
the afternoon. Nonetheless such a strategy would entail some risk. In fact a negative slope of the
rates was not observed every single day and while the average spread is lower in the afternoon, it
is also more volatile as shown by the higher variance bars in Figure 4. Our findings suggest that
while the slope of the intraday yield curve did not guarantee arbitrage opportunities, it did create
opportunities for risk-oriented banks to profit from the pattern of intraday rates. This raises the
interesting question “Are interbank spreads affected by the banks’ decisions to trade either in the
morning or in the afternoon?”.
We answer this question by considering the morning/afternoon (am/pm) volume imbalance ratio
x
am/pm
j,m =
V amj,m − V pmj,m
V amj,m + V
pm
j,m
=
V amj,m − V pmj,m
Vj,m
, (4)
where V amj,m is the volume traded by bank j in the mornings of month m and V
pm
j,m is the volume
traded by bank j in the afternoons of month m. This ratio measures a bank’s decision to borrow
or to lend money when, on average, the rate is respectively higher or lower.
3.2 Market bid-ask spread
Due to missing posted quotes, we construct a proxy of the real bid-ask spread as follows. In each
day, following George, Kaul and Nimalendran (1991), we calculate the volume-weighted average
rates at which buy-initiated transactions and sell-initiated transactions are settled. We take the
difference between these two rates as a proxy of the bid-ask spread. The volume-weighted daily
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average values rbd and r
s
d are defined as
rbd =
1
V bd
Nd∑
j=1
Nbj,d∑
i=1
V bi,j,dr
b
i,j,d (5)
rsd =
1
V sd
Nd∑
j=1
Nsj,d∑
i=1
V si,j,dr
s
i,j,d, (6)
where the superscripts b and s label buy and sell transactions.
The bid-ask spread (or sell-buy spread) can now be easily computed as sd = r
b
d − rsd. Figure 5
shows the evolution of its monthly average and of its monthly variance. The vertical lines indicate
the coordinated intervention of central banks to increase liquidity (August 2007) and the collapse
of Lehman Brothers (September 2008). We show the pattern from the introduction of the Euro
(1999) to stress the flat dynamics before the financial turmoil. Two very well-defined peaks are
clearly present after the crisis milestones.
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Figure 5: Monthly average (left) and monthly variance (right) of the daily sell-buy spread.
The first conclusion we observe is that the spread has dramatically increased during the crisis
and two very well-defined peaks are clearly present in coincidence with the beginning of the crisis
and the collapse of Lehman. During the crisis, the bid-ask spreads have experience values above
200 basis points, when the usual pre-crisis level was about 3 basis points. Liquidity stress seems to
have been absorbed just before the collapse of Lehman, when the bid-ask spread fell below 5 basis
points, the level empirically observed before the sub-prime shock. In both events, the spread trend
is absorbed in a few weeks, with a strong correlation with the volatility of rates (Gabbi, 2005). This
is certainly due to the massive liquidity intervention of the European Central Bank, which in the
period between 2007 and 2018 increased its assets by about 3 trillion euros, using non-conventional
monetary policies, such as standing facilities, marginal lending and open market operations. The
bid-ask spread effect raises the question: “Can banks trade at a more profitable rate if they submit
their orders as quoters rather than as aggressors?” We answer this question by considering as
explanatory variable the quoter/aggressor volume imbalance ratio
x
q/a
j,m =
V qj,m − V aj,m
V qj,m + V
a
j,m
=
V qj,m − V aj,m
Vj,m
, (7)
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where V qj,m is the volume traded by bank j in month m as quoter and V
a
j,m is the volume traded by
bank j in month m as aggressor. This ratio measures a bank’s decision to borrow or to lend money
as an aggressor or a quoter.
3.3 Price impact effect
Our sample of banks is highly heterogeneous with larger (domestic and foreign) banks trading orders
of larger sizes, while smaller banks exchange smaller volumes, as shown in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Distribution of order sizes for different groups of banks as borrower (left subpanels) and
lenders (right subpanels).
The price-volume hypothesis and market concentration hypothesis have been the subject of
many empirical studies in securities markets such as Beaver et al. (1980), Karpoff (1987), Campbell
(1993), Rosu (2009). However, the effect of volume on prices has been underestimated in money
markets. By investigating the role of market concentration on spreads, we can test if some results
that apply to equity and futures market may also be valid for credit markets. More precisely,
we want to detect whether the corollary of the efficient market hypothesis, according to which
large blocks of assets are traded at close to the market price, applies to the interbank market. The
empirical evidence is mixed: in particular, Lamont and Frazzini (2007) suggest that companies with
high trading volume concentration perform better in equity market, while Bushman et al. (2011)
find that volume concentration is negatively correlated to abnormal spread. During the financial
crisis, the role of order size on credit rates could have changed because of the liquidity pressure on
banks and the low depth of the interbank market. Including a concentration variable allows us to
address the question “Are interbank spreads affected by the size of orders relative to the overall
market volume?” We assess this question by considering the concentration ratio
xconcj,m =
Vj,m
Vm
, (8)
where Vj,m is the volume traded by bank j in month m and Vm =
1
2
∑Nj
j=1 Vj,m is the total volume
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traded in the market in month m. The aim of this ratio is to test the impact of order size on spread.
3.4 Reserve requirement effect
Some authors have shown that liquidity trading is influenced by the reserve maintenance period
announced by the ECB. This is intuitively due to the fact that banks are constrained in governing the
average value required by the central bank as the reserve maintenance period approaches. Barucci
et al. (2004) and Iori et al. (2008) have provided evidence that the interest rate exhibits predictable
patterns at the end of the reserve maintenance period, with a consistent decrease reported at the
end of the period before 2001, and a consistent increase after 2001. Gaspar et al. (2008) showed
that market activity intensifies over the reserve maintenance period with the number of trades and
the realised volatility of the overnight interest rate reaching a peak on the last day of the period;
the imbalance between buy and sell orders decreases markedly over the last days; the market spread
follows a similar path with a decrease towards the end of the period. Also, during the last days of
the period, the deviation of e-MID transaction prices from the actual EONIA rate increases. Such
empirical patterns are consistent with theoretical predictions and remain valid across subsamples.
While we do not observe, for the analyzed period, a consistent increase (or decrease) of interbank
rates at the end of reserve maintenance periods, we do ask the question “Are interbank spreads
affected by banks’ trades executed at the end of the reserve maintenance period?” We answer this
question by considering the reserve maintenance period ratio
xrmpj,m =
1
Vj,m
Nj,m∑
d=Nj,m−2
Vj,d, (9)
i.e. the volume traded by bank j in the last three days of month m divided by the total volume
traded by bank j in month m.
4 Methodology and empirical results
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for spread and market microstructure variables for borrowers
and lenders. The comparison of the different periods, before and after the crisis, allows us to
highlight the change in the explaining factors and how they have conditioned the spreads. The
borrowing spread lies between −110 and 50 bps with an average value of 0.48; the highest average
spread was observed during the crisis. The lending spread lies between −118 and 81 bps with
an average value of −0.23. On the borrowing side, while the mean value of the am/pm volume
imbalance ratio x
am/pm
j,m is positive, we observe its smallest value in Period 2, indicating that overall
at the beginning of the crisis banks postponed some of their borrowing activity to the afternoon, in
the attempt to achieve lower rates. After the Lehman default nonetheless borrowing is concentrated
in the morning, probably in response to increasing liquidity pressure on banks. On the lending side,
x
am/pm
j,m becomes negative in Period 2 suggesting liquidity hoarding in the morning, in response to
banks’ increased uncertainty about their own liquidity needs. In Period 3, however, x
am/pm
j,m reverts to
positive and reaches its highest value, indicating that lenders are willing to satisfy the high demand
from borrowers, that pushed the morning rates to very high values after the default of Lehman.
This behaviour may appear surprising because in the post-crisis the ECB offered unlimited amounts
of liquidity at fixed rate. Nonetheless central bank borrowing is collateralised and, as reported by
Baglioni and Monticini (2013), the implicit cost of collaterals increased considerably during and
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after the crisis. The dynamics of the am/pm volume imbalance ratio suggests that banks found
more attractive to borrow in the uncollateralised interbank market after the crisis, and were ready
to pay a premium to secure liquidity early in the trading day, rather than provide collaterals to
secure central bank financing.
As the crisis progresses, we also note a tendency for borrowers to act more often as quoters.
This may depend on the attempt to set the rate a priori in a period of high volatility and increasing
spreads. Lastly, we observe an increase in the concentration ratio over time on both sides of the
market. The variations of the concentration ratio across the three periods are negligible.
For a bank j executing Nj,m transactions on a given reserve maintenance month m, the volume-
weighted monthly average credit spread is
yj,m =
1
Vj,m
Nj,m∑
d=1
Vj,d cj,d. (10)
In our sample we have 42 monthly periods and our regression models in Section 3 rely on monthly
data.
To assess the impact of the microstructure features on monthly credit spreads, we performed the
following pooled OLS regressions with robust standard errors, separately for borrowing and lending
banks:
yj,m = β0 + β1x
am/pm
j,m + β2x
q/a
j,m + β3x
c
j,m + β4x
rmp
j,m
+ β5x
SM
j + β6x
ME
j + β7x
LA
j + β8x
MA
j + β9x
FB
j + uj,m, (11)
where uj,m is the residual. Bank-specific variables are defined as dummies with six levels (Minor,
Small, Medium, Large, Major and Foreign) and the Minor group is chosen as the reference. The
asset size information of the foreign banks is not available for us, even though foreign agents, on
balance, are large institutions. The model is estimated separately for the three subperiods 1, 2 and
3 defined in Table 1. Results for the baseline regressions are reported for the borrowing banks in
Table 3 and for the lending banks in Table 8.
The analysis shows that time of trading is significant and positively correlated with spreads
both on the lending and the borrowing side (trading preferentially in the morning improves lender
performance and reduces borrower performance) in all three periods. The am/pm volume imbalance
ratio x
am/pm
j,m increases over time for both borrowers and lenders, indicating that the effect of timing
on trade becomes more determinant with the progression of the crisis.
Trading preferentially as a quoter improves the performance of both lenders and borrowers.
The coefficient of quoter/agressor volume increases (in absolute value) as the crisis progresses.
These findings suggest that quoters have an advantage in determining interbank rates compared
to aggressors. The statistical significance of this variable may be due, in addition to the spread
affect, to the information content of order flows. Before the crisis, the purchase of liquidity from an
aggressor could have been a signal, with noise, that the aggressor believed the rate was undervalued
(Dagfinn, 2003)). After the crisis, the information content may have changed and simply reveal
how bank treasuries have to balance inflows and outflows.
Volume concentration is significant, and more important in Period 1 and Period 3 for borrowers,
and in Period 2 and Period 3 for lenders. The sign of the Concentration Ratio, positive for borrowers
and negative for lenders, indicates that the volume concentration has a lose-lose effect for both agents
of the liquidity exchange in the interbank market. This result is consistent with the imperfect
substitutes hypothesis (Scholes, 1972, Kraus & Stoll, 1972, Hess & Frost, 1982), which assumes
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that assets are not close substitute for each other. In case of large banks, the small number of
counterparts and the disclosure of higher risks could have affected the rate of interbank deposits.
Therefore, equilibrium rates change when demand curves shift to eliminate excess demand.
The end of the reserve maintenance period is significant for borrowers only after the crisis, when
xrmpj,m has a positive sign thus supporting the hypothesis that in Period 3 banks were constrained
by the reserve requirement. The reserve maintenance period ratio is significant for lenders before
and during the crisis. The negative sign indicates that hoarding liquidity and postponing lending
till the end of the maintenance period, was not a profitable strategy for lenders, at least before the
Lehman default.
We confirm that size is an important variable in the determination of the interbank rate with
borrowing rates decreasing, on average, and lending rates increasing with banks size. The size effect
is particularly strong for borrowers in Period 3. Nonetheless, size is not significant in Period 2,
except for the major banks. This result indicates that when market microstructure variables are
controlled for, size is not as determinant as previously reported in the literature (Angelini et al.
2011, Gabrieli 2012).
Foreign banks (that in this market are typically large), pay higher spreads than the larger
Italian banks as borrowers, and receive lower spreads as lenders, as a result suggesting poor market
integration in the European interbank market.
The F-test statistics reported at the bottom of in Table 3 and Table 8 check whether the
coefficients of the market microstructure variables are jointly equal to zero or not. The statistics
indicate that microstructure variables are jointly significant and enhance the explanatory power of
the model.
Overall, our analysis demonstrates that spreads incorporate a liquidity risk premium (the widen-
ing bid-ask spreads and the increasing intraday slope of interest rates are indicators of liquidity
shortages) in addition to a credit risk premium (that previous studies have associated with bank
sizes). This corroborates the analyses of Michaud and Upper (2008) and Eisenschmidt and Tapking
(2009), which point out that after August 2007 rates reached levels that cannot be explained alone
by a higher credit risk.
4.1 Robustness checks
Our first robustness check aims to control for potential self-selection problem due to the drop in the
number of banks trading in the e-MID market after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Therefore, we
estimate the same model as above for three different sub samples of banks. Firstly, we consider only
banks which have traded at least 25 times in each of the three periods, secondly we consider the
banks which have traded at least 50 times in each of the three period and lastly, we consider all banks
in the sample but control for the banks that dropped out after the collapse of Lehman Brothers
with a dummy variable (Period 3). The findings, reported in Table 3 for borrower and Table 8 for
lenders indicate that the baseline regression results remain virtually unchanged and robust to the
different samples of the dataset. Moreover, banks that drop in Period 3 do not appear to borrow
at significantly different rates compared to the banks that remain active, suggesting that the self-
selection problem is not an issue for our analysis. On the lending side nonetheless the banks that
dropped in Period 3 received consistently lower rates than the banks which remained. This may be a
consequence to the injection of liquidity by the ECB after the Lehman default that possibly limited
profitable lending opportunities in the interbank market. A similar impact has been confirmed by
Barucca and Lillo (2018) during the period when the ECB adopted a particularly expansionary
policy with LTRO operations.
A second check is based on bank-fixed effects capturing bank characteristics such as ownership
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and credit risk. The time-fixed effect captures the evolution of the market across time and common
shocks that can affect all banks. While fixed effect models do not allow to estimate the coefficients
for dummy variables (such as size), they provide the opportunity to check whether pooled OLS
analysis gives similar results to the fixed effect model when only market microstructure variables
are considered. We use the following panel data model with time and bank fixed effects and robust
standard errors:
yj,m = β0 + β1x1,j,m + β2x2,j,m + β3x3,j,m + β4x4,j,m + uj,m (12)
uj,m = um + δm + εj,m. (13)
The results reported in Table 4 for borrowers and in Table 9 for lenders show that, even when
controlling for bank heterogeneity, the relation between spreads and market microstructure variables
remain unchanged respect to the baseline regression model.4
4.2 The relevance of microstructure factors
In this section, we capture the role of the microstructure variables separately for each group, in
terms of their asset size and nationality. To reduce the number of tables we report results only
for the three periods combined together. Also in this case we estimate the baseline regression for
all transactions and perform robustness checks with different samples of banks. The results are
reported in Table 5 for borrowers and Table 10 for lenders.
On the demand side, the time of trading is statistically significant and positive for all groups
of banks, indicating that all banks benefit from borrowing later in the day. Acting as a quoter is
again significant for all groups. Banks achieve lower borrowing rates when trading on this side of
the market. However, the quoter/aggressor volume imbalance ratio is negative but insignificant for
major borrowers. This is possibly due to the fact that the major banks consistently execute more
than 75% of their trades as quoters, thus the quoter/aggressor volume imbalance ratio has little
variability for this group.
On the supply side, lending in the morning and lending as a quoter leads to higher returns for
all groups of banks. Nonetheless, the quoter/aggressor volume imbalance ratio is not significant for
foreign banks. The fact that foreign banks do not achieve better rates when trading as quoters again
suggests poor market integration, which also leads a lower capability to act strategically within the
market. The interbank market gradually disintegrated after the start of the crisis. Banks have also
started to favour domestic counterparties as a result of bail out decisions favouring creditors of the
same citizenship.
When controlling for banks that drop in Period 3, we find that this variable is not significant as a
determinant of the lending rates. On the borrowing side instead our analysis interestingly suggests
that the smaller banks (SM and MI groups) that dropped, while still in the market significantly
outperformed the banks that remained active after the Lehman default. On the contrary, the large
banks that dropped significantly underperformed, in Period 1 and Period 2, the banks that kept
trading in Period 3. Thus, if there was a self-selection issue, the reasons for leaving the e-MID
market may have been different for banks belonging to groups of different size: adverse selection for
the small banks, as suggested by Heider et al. (2015), and a stigma effect associated with signalling
financial distress for the larger ones.
4Temiszoy et al. (2015), performing link-level rather than bank-level regressions, and show that the effect of the
microstructure variable is qualitatively the same also when controlling for the identity of the counterparty to a trade
as well as when including indices of preferential lending and borrowing among the regression variables.
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4.3 Banks’ behaviour
The aim of this section is to establish whether some banks were able to make profit more than others
exploiting the changing microstructure conditions and trading more strategically. In particular, we
focus on the am/pm volume imbalance ratio x
am/pm
j,m and the quoter/aggressor volume imbalance
ratio x
q/a
j,m. We treat them as the dependent variables, and test whether their values changed
significantly across groups and in which direction.
We estimate the following pooled OLS model with robust standard errors, separately for bor-
rowers and lenders:
x
am/pm
j,m = β0 + β1x
SM
j + β2x
ME
j + β3x
LA
j + β4x
MA
j + β5x
FB
j + uj,m (14)
x
q/a
j,m = β0 + β1x
SM
j + β2x
ME
j + β3x
LA
j + β4x
MA
j + β5x
FB
j + uj,m. (15)
The regression outputs reported in Table 6 for borrowers indicate that only major and foreign
borrowers performed the majority of their trades in the afternoon. While both groups increased the
proportion of afternoon trades in Period 2, only major banks increased it even further in Period 3.
Foreign banks did not manage to do so and reverted to the pre-crisis level of afternoon trading in
Period 3. The positive and significant coefficients for the minor banks reveal on the contrary that
they mainly borrowed in the morning, thus paying higher rates. On the lending side, as reported
in Table 11, minor banks lend preferentially in the morning, achieving higher rates, and foreign
banks in the afternoon, achieving lower rates. Overall there is a tendency to hoard liquidity in the
morning in Period 2.
The sign of the coefficients of the quoter/aggressor volume imbalance ratio reported in Table 7
for borrowers and in Table 12 for lenders reveals that, apart from the minor banks, borrowers prefer
to trade as quoters and lenders prefer to trade as aggressors. On the lending side the effect becomes
even more clear with the progression of the crisis. The larger Italian banks and the foreign banks
achieved the largest proportion of borrowing trades as quoters thus achieving better rates. On the
lending side the major banks achieved the largest proportion of trades as quoters in Period 1 and
Period 2, but in Period 3 it was the minor and small banks which traded more often as aggressors.
Our findings indicate that, in addition to the too-big-to-fail argument, the favourable borrowing
and lending conditions of larger banks have partly been the result of a wiser liquidity management.
On the lending side we observe that foreign banks have not been able to optimise their strategies:
small or negative am/pm and quoter/aggressor volume imbalance ratios indicate too much lending
in the afternoon and as aggressors, both of which is less profitable. As mentioned by Cassola et al.
(2010), this observation confirms a poor market integration on this side of the market, with foreign
banks lending mostly to other foreign and large Italian banks that, as seen before, tend to borrow
later in the afternoon.
5 Conclusions
We have investigated the impact of the financial crisis on the behaviour of banks within the electronic
interbank market and, in turn, the drivers after the turmoil over the lending and borrowing spreads.
Running econometric analyses we have highlighted the role of the changing intraday term structure
of the interest rate and of the market bid-ask spread as explanatory variables for the variability in
credit conditions. In particular our results show that the higher the volume traded by a bank in
the morning, the higher the spreads (that is borrowing conditions deteriorate in the morning for
borrowers and improve for lenders) and the higher the volume traded as quoters, the better the
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rates obtained, both for lenders and borrowers.
While our analysis confirms that larger banks did perform better during the crisis, we identify the
reasons for their success. The larger banks responded better to the changing market microstructure
condition and optimised their trades to reduce the liquidity costs. Their stronger performance
was actively achieved by a sophisticated liquidity management and not just the result of the market
participants perceiving them as too big to fail. Our empirical results confirm that the Euro interbank
market after the crisis became more competitive, differentiating banks behaviours. With a more
intense competition, according to the theoretical model introduced by Carletti and Leonello (2018),
the probability of a banking crisis should now be lower. The policy implications of our findings are
as follows.
To reduce the volatility of interbank market rates, central banks should provide liquidity by
calibrating their interventions according to the slope of the intraday term structure. Since this slope
depends on expected short rates, central banks can fine-tune how they provide liquidity playing as
market makers continuously during the trading day, coherently with the real-time gross settlement
of the payment system.
The interest rate volatility stabilization and spread normalization could be pursued introducing
overnight deposits expiring after 24 hours. This way the liquidity settlement would be distributed
along the day, avoiding the concentration of all the interbank trades early in the morning. This
innovation could go along with the introduction of intraday deposits, completing the Arrow-Debreu
market structure.
Finally, the evidence about the dependence of interest-rate spreads on banks’ behavior supports a
revision of their liquidity-management practice. Banks’ treasury departments should try to manage
and net their financial balances by optimizing costs and returns according to the features of the
market microstructure, such as timing their trades, adjusting the concentrations of volumes, possibly
via pooling operations, and choosing the quoter/aggressor side to lend and borrow money.
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Regression results
Table 2: Descriptive statistics.
Borrower Lender
Variable All periods Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 All Periods Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
Volume-weighted monthly Mean 0.48 0.05 1.04 0.15 -0.23 -0.40 -0.49 0.37
average credit spread Std dev 7.19 3.12 7.65 9.78 8.17 4.50 9.11 9.95
Min -110.1 -41.3 -110.1 -84.4 -118.4 -97 -118.4 -44.7
Max 50.1 40.6 39.6 50.1 81.9 13.4 45.3 81.9
Median 0.25 0.18 0.83 -0.49 -0.12 -0.12 0.007 -0.78
Am/pm volume Mean 0.16 0.15 0.12 0.25 0.06 0.04 -0.015 0.22
imbalance ratio Std dev 0.67 0.64 0.68 0.69 0.65 0.63 0.65 0.66
Min -1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1
Max 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Median 0.32 0.29 0.25 0.43 0.19 0.14 0.08 0.40
Quoter/aggressor volume Mean 0.31 0.28 0.28 0.42 -0.62 -0.59 -0.63 -0.66
imbalance ratio Std dev 0.69 0.68 0.70 0.67 0.50 0.51 0.49 0.51
Min -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Max 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Median 0.57 0.54 0.52 0.69 -0.89 -0.84 -0.87 -0.96
Concentration ratio Mean 0.0098 0.0083 0.0091 0.0128 0.0075 0.0066 0.0069 0.0096
Std dev 0.0187 0.0154 0.0157 0.0256 0.0129 0.0112 0.0111 0.0169
Min 7e-07 9e-06 7e-06 2e-06 6e-06 6e-07 1e-06 4e-06
Max 0.2177 0.1877 0.1374 0.2177 0.2239 0.0997 0.1046 0.2239
Median 0.0025 0.0020 0.0027 0.0033 0.0028 0.0022 0.0026 0.0040
Reserve maintenance Mean 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.18
period ratio Std dev 0.24 0.22 0.23 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.25
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Max 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Median 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.10
Table 3: t-test p-values for Table 2.
Borrower Lender
Variable Periods 1–2 Periods 2–3 Periods 1–3 Periods 1–2 Periods 2–3 Periods 1–3
Average credit spread 0.00 0.00 0.70 0.70 0.00 0.00
am/pm imbalance ratio 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
q/a imbalance ratio 0.98 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.00
Concentration ratio 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.00
Reserve period ratio 0.92 0.38 0.34 0.41 0.03 0.16
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Table 4: Pooled OLS results for borrowers.
Baseline regressions Robustness check
All transactions Min transaction 25 Min transaction 50 Dropped banks controlled
Variable All Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis All Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis All Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis All Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
Am/pm imbalance r. 3.29*** 1.18*** 3.65*** 5.07*** 3.70*** 1.42*** 4.18*** 4.95*** 4.59*** 1.73*** 5.80*** 5.58*** 3.30*** 1.19*** 3.65*** 5.07***
(0.22) (0.16) (0.41) (0.46) (0.30) (0.22) (0.65) (0.44) (0.39) (0.31) (0.95) (0.50) (0.22) (0.17) (0.41) (0.46)
Q/a imbalance ratio -2.73*** -1.04*** -2.56*** -5.14*** -3.14*** -1.01*** -3.20*** -5.40*** -2.84*** -0.81*** -2.54*** -5.32*** -2.76*** -1.05*** -2.58*** -5.14***
(0.18) (0.12) (0.32) (0.44) (0.21) (0.14) (0.44) (0.48) (0.27) (0.22) (0.60) (0.60) (0.18) (0.12) (0.33) (0.44)
Concentration ratio 0.12*** 0.15*** 0.03 0.22** 0.15*** 0.12** 0.08 0.25*** 0.16*** 0.14* 0.21** 0.21** 0.12*** 0.15*** 0.03 0.22**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.09) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.05) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.09)
Reserve period ratio 0.34 -0.78 -0.11 2.23** 1.54** -1.04 2.93* 2.66** 1.27 -1.45 3.86* 1.44 0.32 -0.82 -0.11 2.23**
(0.65) (0.88) (1.24) (1.11) (0.75) (0.83) (1.53) (1.20) (0.90) (1.02) (1.98) (1.34) (0.65) (0.89) (1.24) (1.11)
Small banks -1.44*** -1.01* -0.24 -2.24** -1.43*** -0.48* -1.14 -2.43** -0.22 -0.75*** -1.70 0.22 -1.46*** -1.06* -0.25 -2.24**
(0.52) (0.55) (0.84) (1.05) (0.55) (0.25) (0.77) (1.15) (0.72) (0.26) (1.47) (1.40) (0.52) (0.55) (0.84) (1.05)
Medium banks -1.32** -1.35** 0.81 -3.23*** -1.08* -0.44 -0.14 -3.14** -0.63 -1.06*** -2.19 -0.59 -1.31** -1.35** 0.81 -3.23***
(0.57) (0.61) (0.95) (1.16) (0.59) (0.28) (0.83) (1.29) (0.74) (0.29) (1.47) (1.49) (0.57) (0.61) (0.95) (1.16)
Large banks -3.06*** -2.03*** -1.56 -6.39*** -3.45*** -1.80*** -2.37*** -6.40*** -2.20*** -1.95*** -2.85** -3.63** -2.96*** -1.95*** -1.49 -6.39***
(0.61) (0.64) (0.97) (1.37) (0.67) (0.57) (0.91) (1.47) (0.79) (0.62) (1.32) (1.64) (0.62) (0.65) (0.98) (1.37)
Major banks -3.86*** -2.00*** -3.28** -5.78*** -3.73*** -0.88*** -3.87*** -5.83*** -2.05** -1.05*** -3.84*** -2.58 -3.80*** -1.94*** -3.24** -5.78***
(0.76) (0.63) (1.41) (1.68) (0.81) (0.32) (1.30) (1.75) (0.87) (0.39) (1.43) (1.88) (0.77) (0.62) (1.42) (1.68)
Foreign banks -0.83 -1.05** -0.27 -0.85 -0.15 -0.22 -0.08 -0.42 1.28* -0.47 -0.35 2.67* -0.77 -1.02** -0.22 -0.85
(0.57) (0.52) (0.99) (1.18) (0.61) (0.30) (0.87) (1.33) (0.75) (0.47) (1.25) (1.59) (0.57) (0.52) (0.99) (1.18)
Dropped banks -0.44 -0.35 -0.30
(0.29) (0.26) (0.58)
Constant 1.96*** 1.31*** 1.63** 2.59** 1.64*** 0.71*** 2.03** 2.56** 0.01 0.81*** 1.44 -0.09 2.00*** 1.38*** 1.65** 2.59**
(0.50) (0.47) (0.80) (1.02) (0.57) (0.25) (0.81) (1.16) (0.70) (0.28) (1.11) (1.52) (0.50) (0.48) (0.81) (1.02)
Observations 4,268 1,438 1,742 1,088 2,766 825 1,110 831 2,296 673 910 713 4,268 1,438 1,742 1,088
R-squared 0.20 0.16 0.21 0.31 0.23 0.22 0.25 0.32 0.25 0.23 0.28 0.33 0.20 0.16 0.21 0.31
F-statistics 100.05 24.78 30.03 70.83 92 26.88 28.41 67.47 71.70 18.16 22.94 55.59 100.16 23.68 29.73 70.83
Robust standard errors are in parentheses (*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1).
The null hypothesis of F-statistics is that the coefficients of x1, x2, x3 and x4 are jointly equal to 0.
Table 5: Fixed-effect model for borrowers.
Baseline regressions Robustness check
All transactions Min transaction 25 Min transaction 50 Dropped banks controlled
Variable All Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis All Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis All Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis All Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
Am/pm imbalance r. 2.87*** 1.45*** 3.42*** 2.37*** 3.27*** 1.63*** 4.39*** 2.33*** 3.97*** 1.96*** 6.32*** 1.98*** 2.87*** 1.45*** 3.42*** 2.37***
(0.29) (0.28) (0.61) (0.56) (0.45) (0.40) (1.14) (0.62) (0.57) (0.55) (1.65) (0.63) (0.29) (0.28) (0.61) (0.56)
Q/a imabalance ratio -1.68*** -0.65** -1.64*** -2.78*** -1.74*** -0.16 -2.03** -2.67*** -1.44** 0.23 -1.92* -2.23*** -1.68*** -0.65** -1.64*** -2.78***
(0.32) (0.29) (0.53) (0.46) (0.49) (0.51) (0.86) (0.62) (0.60) (0.67) (1.01) (0.67) (0.32) (0.29) (0.53) (0.46)
Concentration ratio 0.64 -1.08 -0.07 3.43*** 1.80*** -0.47 3.07* 3.82*** 1.44** -1.04 4.58** 2.52*** 0.64 -1.08 -0.07 3.43***
(0.63) (0.81) (1.36) (1.17) (0.56) (0.64) (1.59) (1.04) (0.61) (0.73) (2.21) (0.94) (0.63) (0.81) (1.36) (1.17)
Reserve period ratio 0.27*** 0.03 0.27** 0.60*** 0.25** -0.00 0.20 0.56*** 0.27** -0.04 0.21 0.54** 0.27*** 0.03 0.27** 0.60***
(0.09) (0.05) (0.11) (0.20) (0.10) (0.09) (0.15) (0.20) (0.11) (0.12) (0.16) (0.21) (0.09) (0.05) (0.11) (0.20)
Observations 4,268 1,438 1,742 1,088 2,766 825 1,110 831 2,296 673 910 713 4,268 1,438 1,742 1,088
R-squared 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.16 0.14 0.10 0.13 0.17 0.15 0.12 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.16
Number of borrowers 182 163 166 136 74 74 74 74 59 59 59 59 182 163 166 136
Robust standard errors are in parentheses (*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1).
Table 6: Pooled OLS results for different groups of borrowers.
Baseline legressions Robustness check
All transactions Min transaction 25 Min transaction 50 Dropped banks controlled
Variable All minor banks All small banks All medium banks All large banks All major banks All foreign banks All minor banks All small banks All medium banks All large banks All major banks All foreign banks All minor banks All small banks All medium banks All large banks All major banks All foreign banks All minor banks All small banks All medium banks All large banks All major banks All foreign banks
Am/pm imbalance r. 0.47 4.62*** 6.48*** 5.36*** 4.32*** 3.68*** 2.88*** 3.83*** 3.25*** 3.78*** 4.13*** 2.92*** 0.47 4.62*** 6.48*** 5.36*** 4.32*** 3.68*** 2.88*** 3.83*** 3.25*** 3.78*** 4.13*** 2.92***
(2.13) (0.63) (0.70) (1.16) (1.06) (0.56) (0.82) (0.46) (0.48) (0.90) (0.95) (0.28) (2.13) (0.63) (0.70) (1.16) (1.06) (0.56) (0.82) (0.46) (0.48) (0.90) (0.95) (0.28)
Q/a imbalance ratio -23.07*** -2.78*** -2.08*** -4.66*** -1.85 -3.19*** -3.05*** -2.99*** -4.36*** -3.94*** -1.89 -2.21*** -23.07*** -2.78*** -2.08*** -4.66*** -1.85 -3.19*** -3.05*** -2.99*** -4.36*** -3.94*** -1.89 -2.21***
(6.24) (0.33) (0.67) (0.81) (1.91) (0.55) (0.80) (0.30) (0.43) (0.59) (1.71) (0.27) (6.24) (0.33) (0.67) (0.81) (1.91) (0.55) (0.80) (0.30) (0.43) (0.59) (1.71) (0.27)
Concentration ratio 10.68 0.58*** 0.05 0.13** 0.20 0.15 12.17* 0.49*** -0.10 0.13** 0.19 0.09 10.68 0.58*** 0.05 0.13** 0.20 0.15 12.17* 0.49*** -0.10 0.13** 0.19 0.09
(9.43) (0.17) (0.10) (0.06) (0.28) (0.11) (6.80) (0.17) (0.09) (0.06) (0.26) (0.07) (9.43) (0.17) (0.10) (0.06) (0.28) (0.11) (6.80) (0.17) (0.09) (0.06) (0.26) (0.07)
Reserve period ratio 2.78 1.84 2.24 -2.01 2.40 0.24 0.07 0.57 2.26 -2.80 1.80 0.24 2.78 1.84 2.24 -2.01 2.40 0.24 0.07 0.57 2.26 -2.80 1.80 0.24
(1.92) (1.40) (1.63) (2.32) (2.90) (1.48) (2.45) (1.12) (2.06) (2.10) (2.83) (0.96) (1.92) (1.40) (1.63) (2.32) (2.90) (1.48) (2.45) (1.12) (2.06) (2.10) (2.83) (0.96)
Dropped banks -2.69*** -1.27* -0.74 2.03*** 0.81 -0.59 -2.69*** -1.27* -0.74 2.03*** 0.81 -0.59
(0.78) (0.65) (1.39) (0.55) (1.07) (0.42) (0.78) (0.65) (1.39) (0.55) (1.07) (0.42)
Constant 16.77*** -0.57 -1.87*** -0.85 -3.00*** 1.79*** 1.89** 0.21 1.30** -0.67 -2.84*** 1.01*** 16.77*** -0.57 -1.87*** -0.85 -3.00*** 1.79*** 1.89** 0.21 1.30** -0.67 -2.84*** 1.01***
(4.30) (0.50) (0.70) (0.68) (1.12) (0.57) (0.77) (0.36) (0.51) (0.60) (1.06) (0.28) (4.30) (0.50) (0.70) (0.68) (1.12) (0.57) (0.77) (0.36) (0.51) (0.60) (1.06) (0.28)
Observations 32 1,281 278 207 155 343 321 1,678 432 278 187 1,372 32 1,281 278 207 155 343 321 1,678 432 278 187 1,372
R-squared 0.49 0.22 0.42 0.24 0.10 0.22 0.14 0.19 0.27 0.24 0.11 0.15 0.49 0.22 0.42 0.24 0.10 0.22 0.14 0.19 0.27 0.24 0.11 0.15
Robust standard errors are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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Table 7: Pooled OLS results for am/pm volume imbalance for borrowers.
Baseline regressions Robustness check
All transactions Min transaction 25 Min transaction 50 Dropped banks controlled
Variable All Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis All Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis All Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis All Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
Small banks 0.34 0.37 0.38 0.28** 0.36 0.40 0.39 0.32 0.37*** 0.39 0.39*** 0.32** 0.35 0.36 0.38 0.28**
(0.05) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.07) (0.16) (0.16) (0.05) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08)
Medium banks 0.26** 0.24 0.22 0.34 0.26** 0.26 0.24 0.33 0.46*** 0.49* 0.49*** 0.40** 0.26** 0.22 0.22 0.34
(0.05) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.10) (0.08) (0.16) (0.17) (0.05) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09)
Large banks 0.26** 0.18 0.23 0.42 0.26** 0.16* 0.20* 0.42 0.27*** 0.16* 0.21*** 0.43*** 0.25** 0.14* 0.23 0.42
(0.05) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.16) (0.17) (0.05) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09)
Major banks -0.16*** 0.04*** -0.23*** -0.35*** -0.20*** 0.08** -0.28*** -0.35*** -0.19 0.07** -0.27 -0.35* -0.16*** 0.01*** -0.23*** -0.35***
(0.06) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.15) (0.13) (0.14) (0.11) (0.11) (0.17) (0.18) (0.06) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11)
Foreign banks -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.20*** 0.14*** -0.01*** -0.04*** -0.08*** 0.16*** 0.08 0.03*** 0.00*** 0.23 -0.10*** -0.12*** -0.21*** 0.14***
(0.05) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.10) (0.09) (0.16) (0.18) (0.05) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09)
Dropped banks 0.03 0.10** 0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
Constant (Minor ref. group) 0.37*** 0.33*** 0.34*** 0.44*** 0.45*** 0.43*** 0.44*** 0.50*** -0.06 0.33*** -0.44*** -0.04 0.37*** 0.31*** 0.34*** 0.44***
(0.04) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.10) (0.07) (0.16) (0.16) (0.04) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07)
Observations 4,268 1,438 1,742 1,088 2,766 825 1,110 831 2,296 673 910 713 4,268 1,438 1,742 1,088
R-squared 0.10 0.10 0.15 0.05 0.09 0.10 0.14 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.18 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.15 0.05
The coefficients of Small, Medium, Large, Major and Foreign groups are presented as the sum of reference group and the coefficient of related group to compare the coefficients easily.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses ( *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
Table 8: Pooled OLS results for quoter/aggressor volume imbalance for borrowers.
Baseline regressions Robustness check
All transactions Min transaction 25 Min transaction 50 Dropped banks controlled
Variable All Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis All Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis All Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis All Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
Small banks 0.23*** 0.13*** 0.19*** 0.40*** 0.32* 0.23 0.26 0.47 0.37*** 0.30*** 0.33*** 0.50*** 0.24*** 0.14*** 0.18*** 0.40***
(0.05) (0.10) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.18) (0.12) (0.15) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.10) (0.07) (0.08)
Medium banks 0.37*** 0.35*** 0.28*** 0.53*** 0.34* 0.31* 0.23 0.52 0.54*** 0.51*** 0.52*** 0.61*** 0.40** 0.36*** 0.30*** 0.53***
(0.05) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.19) (0.13) (0.16) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.11) (0.08) (0.10)
Large banks 0.52*** 0.45*** 0.51*** 0.64*** 0.51*** 0.28 0.57*** 0.63** 0.50*** 0.27*** 0.57*** 0.63*** 0.59*** 0.49*** 0.63*** 0.64***
(0.05) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.20) (0.13) (0.15) (0.04) (0.08) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.11) (0.08) (0.09)
Major banks 0.54*** 0.45*** 0.62*** 0.56*** 0.55*** 0.39** 0.67*** 0.56 0.55*** 0.38*** 0.67*** 0.56*** 0.59*** 0.49*** 0.67*** 0.56***
(0.06) (0.11) (0.09) (0.12) (0.09) (0.20) (0.13) (0.17) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.06) (0.11) (0.09) (0.12)
Foreign banks 0.48*** 0.46*** 0.47*** 0.56*** 0.59*** 0.48*** 0.60*** 0.68** 0.56*** 0.40*** 0.60*** 0.68*** 0.54*** 0.49*** 0.56*** 0.56***
(0.05) (0.10) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.19) (0.12) (0.15) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.10) (0.07) (0.09)
Dropped banks -0.29*** -0.11** -0.48***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
Constant (Minor ref. group) -0.26*** -0.41*** -0.29*** -0.10 0.17** -0.03 0.18 0.31** 0.91*** 0.83*** 0.91*** 0.99*** -0.23*** -0.39*** -0.25*** -0.10
(0.04) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.18) (0.12) (0.14) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08)
Observations 4,268 1,438 1,742 1,088 2,766 825 1,110 831 2,296 673 910 713 4,268 1,438 1,742 1,088
R-squared 0.086 0.104 0.099 0.077 0.040 0.032 0.079 0.026 0.034 0.027 0.069 0.029 0.101 0.107 0.139 0.077
The coefficients of Small, Medium, Large, Major and Foreign groups are presented as the sum of reference group and the coefficient of related group to facilitate comparison.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
Table 9: Pooled OLS results for lenders.
Baseline regressions Robustness Check
All transactions Min transaction 25 Min transaction 50 Dropped banks controlled
Variable All Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis All Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis All Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis All Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
Am/pm imbalance r. 3.42*** 1.28*** 4.29*** 4.45*** 3.86*** 1.01*** 5.00*** 5.01*** 3.66*** 0.99*** 4.22*** 5.28*** 3.44*** 1.31*** 4.33*** 4.45***
(0.20) (0.23) (0.36) (0.41) (0.24) (0.19) (0.44) (0.46) (0.26) (0.19) (0.45) (0.51) (0.20) (0.25) (0.35) (0.41)
Q/a imbalance ratio 2.56*** 0.80* 2.78*** 4.73*** 3.01*** 1.64*** 2.86*** 5.18*** 3.21*** 1.50*** 2.99*** 5.59*** 2.58*** 0.79* 2.82*** 4.73***
(0.28) (0.45) (0.47) (0.56) (0.25) (0.25) (0.32) (0.66) (0.27) (0.18) (0.31) (0.72) (0.28) (0.46) (0.47) (0.56)
Concentration ratio -0.36*** -0.04 -0.29*** -0.66*** -0.47*** -0.01 -0.44*** -0.74*** -0.48*** -0.04 -0.40*** -0.74*** -0.39*** -0.06 -0.34*** -0.66***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.11) (0.13) (0.07) (0.04) (0.11) (0.14) (0.08) (0.03) (0.11) (0.14) (0.06) (0.04) (0.11) (0.13)
Reserve period ratio -3.57*** -2.69** -5.44*** -1.37 -4.10*** -4.25*** -6.89*** -0.90 -2.80** -3.43** -4.74* -0.19 -3.59*** -2.68** -5.52*** -1.37
(0.83) (1.15) (1.61) (1.05) (1.07) (1.61) (2.29) (1.14) (1.19) (1.74) (2.46) (1.22) (0.83) (1.15) (1.61) (1.05)
Small banks 0.31 0.09 -0.10 1.41** 0.97*** 0.01 0.36 2.69*** 1.07*** 0.08 0.45 2.71*** 0.28 0.03 -0.12 1.41**
(0.29) (0.18) (0.40) (0.69) (0.27) (0.14) (0.33) (0.65) (0.27) (0.13) (0.32) (0.65) (0.29) (0.16) (0.40) (0.69)
Medium banks 0.32 -0.06 0.08 1.35 1.30*** 0.40* 1.05* 2.20** 0.80** 0.38** 0.17 1.40 0.36 -0.04 0.15 1.35
(0.44) (0.46) (0.75) (0.90) (0.37) (0.21) (0.58) (0.90) (0.36) (0.16) (0.51) (0.88) (0.44) (0.46) (0.76) (0.90)
Large banks 1.32*** 1.29*** 2.59*** 1.54 2.75*** 1.28*** 3.90*** 4.64*** 2.68*** 1.31*** 3.60*** 4.71*** 1.61*** 1.49*** 2.94*** 1.54
(0.41) (0.27) (0.62) (1.25) (0.47) (0.43) (0.71) (1.04) (0.47) (0.42) (0.66) (1.04) (0.42) (0.36) (0.64) (1.25)
Major banks 2.15*** 1.36*** 0.83 5.36*** 3.21*** 0.83*** 1.92* 6.93*** 3.10*** 0.88*** 1.48 6.99*** 2.32*** 1.50*** 1.07 5.36***
(0.57) (0.33) (1.03) (1.40) (0.64) (0.32) (1.13) (1.37) (0.65) (0.30) (1.14) (1.38) (0.58) (0.40) (1.03) (1.40)
Foreign banks 0.76** 0.40** 0.69 1.33 1.94*** 0.16 2.00*** 3.67*** 2.03*** 0.14 1.85*** 4.10*** 0.90*** 0.45** 0.97** 1.33
(0.33) (0.20) (0.50) (0.92) (0.37) (0.26) (0.54) (1.02) (0.46) (0.17) (0.64) (1.27) (0.33) (0.20) (0.49) (0.92)
Dropped banks -1.11*** -0.57 -1.53**
(0.38) (0.48) (0.66)
Constant 1.59*** 0.28 2.28*** 2.07*** 1.22*** 1.14*** 2.10*** 0.77 1.22*** 0.93** 2.08*** 0.86 1.67*** 0.36 2.38*** 2.07***
(0.33) (0.47) (0.50) (0.68) (0.33) (0.37) (0.47) (0.73) (0.34) (0.38) (0.46) (0.77) (0.33) (0.42) (0.49) (0.68)
Observations 5,568 1,816 2,300 1,452 4,038 1,203 1,598 1,237 3,503 1,020 1,372 1,111 5,568 1,816 2,300 1,452
R-squared 0.13 0.08 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.20 0.19 0.15 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.13 0.08 0.17 0.16
F-statistics 91.63 26.02 42.21 42.06 92.63 24.04 48.67 38.68 81.85 36.59 43.94 36.32 93.06 26.36 42.21 42.3
Robust standard errors are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
The null hypothesis of F-statistics is that the coefficients of x1, x2, x3 and x4 are jointly equal to 0.
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Table 10: Fixed-effect model results for lenders.
All transactions Min transaction 25 Min transaction 50 Dropped banks controlled
Variable All Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis All Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis All Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis All Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
Am/pm imbalance r. 3.299*** 1.091*** 3.996*** 3.477*** 3.946*** 1.054*** 5.366*** 3.928*** 3.895*** 0.788* 4.941*** 4.133*** 3.299*** 1.091*** 3.996*** 3.477***
(0.335) (0.254) (0.640) (0.544) (0.399) (0.362) (0.787) (0.564) (0.469) (0.415) (0.896) (0.592) (0.335) (0.254) (0.640) (0.544)
Q/a imbalance ratio 2.313*** 1.706** 3.431*** 2.816** 2.548*** 2.409*** 3.389*** 3.551*** 2.156*** 1.828** 2.391*** 4.201*** 2.313*** 1.706** 3.431*** 2.816**
(0.463) (0.681) (0.699) (1.130) (0.602) (0.890) (0.860) (1.332) (0.588) (0.720) (0.603) (1.534) (0.463) (0.681) (0.699) (1.130)
Concentation aatio -3.549*** -2.440*** -4.721*** -2.117 -3.709*** -3.443*** -4.633** -2.264 -3.829*** -3.359*** -4.263** -2.640 -3.549*** -2.440*** -4.721*** -2.117
(0.810) (0.876) (1.442) (1.325) (0.979) (1.054) (1.784) (1.491) (1.105) (1.151) (1.981) (1.680) (0.810) (0.876) (1.442) (1.325)
Reserve period ratio -0.429*** -0.023 -0.415** -0.511*** -0.520*** -0.004 -0.409** -0.537*** -0.552*** -0.025 -0.450** -0.549*** -0.429*** -0.023 -0.415** -0.511***
(0.094) (0.080) (0.174) (0.131) (0.110) (0.061) (0.201) (0.131) (0.129) (0.047) (0.197) (0.134) (0.094) (0.080) (0.174) (0.131)
Observations 5,568 1,816 2,300 1,452 4,038 1,203 1,598 1,237 3,503 1,020 1,372 1,111 5,568 1,816 2,300 1,452
R-squared 0.115 0.101 0.129 0.137 0.140 0.138 0.163 0.165 0.147 0.150 0.152 0.191 0.115 0.101 0.129 0.137
Number of lenders 195 178 181 151 104 104 104 104 88 88 88 88 195 178 181 151
Robust standard errors are in parentheses (*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1).
Table 11: Pooled OLS results for different groups of lenders.
Baseline regressions Robustness check
All transactions Min transaction 25 Min transaction 50 Dropped banks controlled
Variable All minor banks All small banks All medium banks All large banks All major banks All foreign banks All minor banks All small banks All medium banks All large banks All major banks All foreign banks All minor banks All small banks All medium banks All large banks All major banks All foreign banks All minor banks All small banks All medium banks All large banks All major banks All foreign banks
Am/pm imbalance r. 2.87*** 4.46*** 5.00*** 3.87*** 3.55*** 2.19*** 3.22*** 4.35*** 4.19*** 3.78*** 3.59*** 2.72*** 3.22*** 3.99*** 4.22*** 3.78*** 3.59*** 2.84*** 2.88*** 4.46*** 4.93*** 3.87*** 3.55*** 2.24***
(0.42) (0.34) (0.78) (0.69) (0.97) (0.33) (0.47) (0.36) (0.67) (0.85) (1.01) (0.46) (0.47) (0.37) (0.72) (0.85) (1.01) (0.61) (0.42) (0.34) (0.77) (0.69) (0.96) (0.34)
Q/a imbalance ratio 3.94*** 3.34*** 2.14*** 1.05** 2.54*** 1.17 3.68*** 3.32*** 1.87*** 1.84* 2.56*** 2.08** 3.68*** 3.42*** 1.99*** 1.84* 2.56*** 2.80 3.93*** 3.35*** 2.17*** 1.38*** 2.53*** 1.19
(0.45) (0.34) (0.78) (0.50) (0.82) (0.75) (0.36) (0.35) (0.58) (0.93) (0.91) (0.90) (0.36) (0.34) (0.61) (0.93) (0.91) (1.72) (0.47) (0.34) (0.75) (0.53) (0.81) (0.74)
Concentration ratio -1.90*** -0.76*** -0.66*** -0.16 -0.34* 0.05 -1.72*** -0.73*** -0.77*** -0.10 -0.31 -0.06 -1.72*** -0.71*** -0.60** -0.10 -0.31 -0.10 -1.91*** -0.76*** -0.67*** -0.16 -0.33* 0.02
(0.35) (0.09) (0.22) (0.15) (0.19) (0.10) (0.30) (0.09) (0.25) (0.16) (0.21) (0.12) (0.30) (0.09) (0.23) (0.16) (0.21) (0.14) (0.37) (0.09) (0.23) (0.15) (0.19) (0.10)
Reserve period ratio -4.56** -6.51*** -6.29** -0.80 -3.37 0.55 -2.12 -6.53*** -1.26 5.03*** -2.02 1.17 -2.12 -4.30*** -3.38** 5.03*** -2.02 1.43 -4.59** -6.50*** -6.23* -0.76 -3.33 0.51
(2.18) (1.41) (3.15) (1.67) (6.00) (1.16) (2.09) (1.46) (1.42) (1.58) (6.62) (2.30) (2.09) (1.60) (1.47) (1.58) (6.62) (3.38) (2.21) (1.41) (3.18) (1.68) (6.00) (1.16)
Dropped banks -0.18 0.10 -0.72 -0.81 -1.01 -0.73
(0.67) (0.56) (1.90) (0.54) (0.92) (0.59)
Constant 3.42*** 3.02*** 2.45*** 1.12*** 3.64*** -0.01 2.20*** 2.95*** 1.54*** 0.79 3.52*** 0.97 2.20*** 2.78*** 1.47*** 0.79 3.52*** 1.69 3.43*** 3.02*** 2.52*** 1.53*** 3.78*** 0.17
(0.53) (0.33) (0.75) (0.41) (1.17) (0.75) (0.45) (0.34) (0.51) (0.80) (1.30) (0.99) (0.45) (0.34) (0.55) (0.80) (1.30) (1.72) (0.54) (0.33) (0.73) (0.49) (1.16) (0.69)
Observations 711 2,226 440 256 197 1,738 524 2,104 344 126 165 775 524 1,961 288 126 165 439 711 2,226 440 256 197 1,738
R-squared 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.20 0.12 0.05 0.23 0.18 0.24 0.27 0.10 0.08 0.23 0.16 0.26 0.27 0.10 0.08 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.12 0.05
Robust standard errors are in parentheses (*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1).
Table 12: Pooled OLS results for am/pm volume imbalance ratio for lenders.
Baseline regressions Robustness check
All transactions Min transaction 25 Min transaction 50 Dropped banks controlled
Variable All Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis All Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis All Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis All Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
Small banks 0.19* 0.12* 0.13 0.30 0.18*** 0.12*** 0.14*** 0.31 0.21** 0.16** 0.16*** 0.35 0.19 0.12* 0.13 0.30
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Medium banks 0.05*** -0.04*** -0.05*** 0.28 0.11*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.31 0.18*** 0.08** 0.10*** 0.37 0.05*** -0.06*** -0.05*** 0.28
(0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
Large banks 0.20 0.34* 0.13 0.01*** 0.29 0.60*** 0.19 0.16 0.29 0.60*** 0.19 0.16 0.18 0.28 0.11 0.01***
(0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.10) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.10) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10)
Major banks 0.07*** -0.03*** -0.01** 0.28 0.06*** -0.08*** 0.00*** 0.28 0.06*** -0.08*** 0.00*** 0.28 0.06*** -0.07*** -0.02** 0.28
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.11) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.11) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10)
Foreign banks -0.17*** -0.14*** -0.24*** -0.04*** -0.12*** -0.07*** -0.21*** -0.02*** 0.04*** 0.09*** -0.06*** 0.16* -0.18*** -0.16*** -0.26*** -0.04***
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06)
Dropped banks 0.08** 0.12*** 0.09
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06)
Constant (Minor ref. group) 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.16*** 0.31*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.30*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.30*** 0.23*** 0.20*** 0.16*** 0.31***
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Observations 5,568 1,816 2,300 1,452 4,038 1,203 1,598 1,237 3,503 1,020 1,372 1,111 5,568 1,816 2,300 1,452
R-squared 0.063 0.056 0.074 0.045 0.047 0.053 0.073 0.035 0.017 0.038 0.031 0.014 0.064 0.061 0.075 0.045
The coefficients of Small, Medium, Large, Major and Foreign groups are presented as the sum of the reference group and the coefficient of the related group to facilitate the comparison.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses (*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1).
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Table 13: Pooled OLS results for quoter/aggressor volume imbalance for lenders.
Baseline regressions Robustness check
All transactions Min transaction 25 Min transaction 50 Dropped banks controlled
Variable All Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis All Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis All Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis All Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
Small banks -0.59*** -0.54*** -0.57** -0.66** -0.59** -0.53*** -0.56*** -0.67 -0.60*** -0.57*** -0.57*** -0.66 -0.58*** -0.54*** -0.56** -0.66**
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Medium banks -0.50*** -0.46*** -0.48*** -0.56 -0.55*** -0.51*** -0.53*** -0.59 -0.54*** -0.53** -0.54** -0.55* -0.50*** -0.46*** -0.49*** -0.56
(0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Large banks -0.54*** -0.36*** -0.62 -0.78*** -0.65 -0.52** -0.62 -0.79* -0.65 -0.52** -0.62 - 0.79* -0.55*** -0.35*** -0.64 -0.78***
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Major banks -0.48*** -0.36*** -0.39*** - 0.76** -0.48*** -0.35*** -0.33*** - 0.75 -0.48*** -0.35*** -0.33*** -0.75 -0.48** -0.36*** -0.39*** -0.76**
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08)
Foreign banks - 0.74*** -0.70 -0.76*** -0.76*** - 0.72 -0.61* -0.75 -0.80** -0.74* -0.66 -0.76 - 0.79** -0.74*** -0.70 -0.77*** -0.76***
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
Dropped control 0.04* -0.03 0.08*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Constant (Minor ref. group) -0.65*** -0.75*** -0.65*** -0.57*** -0.69*** -0.70*** -0.69*** -0.67*** -0.69*** -0.70*** -0.69*** -0.67*** -0.65*** -0.75*** -0.65*** -0.57***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Observations 5,568 1,816 2,300 1,452 4,038 1,203 1,598 1,237 3,503 1,020 1,372 1,111 5,568 1,816 2,300 1,452
R-squared 0.027 0.054 0.044 0.019 0.019 0.021 0.044 0.015 0.019 0.026 0.040 0.016 0.028 0.054 0.046 0.019
The coefficients of Small, Medium, Large, Major and Foreign groups are presented as the sum of the reference group and the coefficient of the related group to facilitate the comparison.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses (*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1).
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